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I. INTRODUCTION
This case note will focus on the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Simmonds.1 The case focused 
on the issue of whether equitable tolling principles should be applied 
to the section 16(b) provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
and, if so, what standard for equitable tolling should be applied—
generally established principles or a derivative version.2
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was created 
to monitor stock creation and trading.3 Section 16 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 19344 sets out the guidelines for short-term stock 
trading by “[d]irectors, officers, and principal stockholders.” 5
Section 16(a) addresses the disclosure of trading activities by 
corporate insiders.6 Section 16(b) prohibits insider trading based on 
* Lydia Park is a third-year student at Pepperdine University School of 
Law and a Literary Citation Editor for the Journal of the National Association of 
Administrative Law Judiciary.  Before attending law school, Lydia worked five 
years in Investor Relations at Hyundai Motor Company, and prior to that, she 
worked in Marketing Strategy and Brand Management.  Lydia would like to thank 
her entire family, but especially her parents, who have been and always will be her 
inspiration.  Lastly, she would like to thank the Lord for giving her a little more 
time to live out her life on this Earth.
1 132 S. Ct. 1414 (2012).
2 See generally id.
3 See generally U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/index.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2013); see infra Part II.B and 
notes 32–35 for more details on its creation.
4 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2012).
5 Id.
6 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a).  The term “insider” usually describes a director, 
officer, or principal stockholder.  Also, the SEC describes “insider trading” in the 
following manner: 
“Insider trading” is a term that most investors have 
heard and usually associate with illegal conduct.  But the term 
actually includes both legal and illegal conduct.  The legal 
version is when corporate insiders—officers, directors, and 
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short-swing profits—the purchase and sale of shares within six 
months—and creates a cause of action for the breach of that 
prohibition.  Section 16(a)(1) reads:
Every person who is directly or indirectly the 
beneficial owner of more than 10 percent of any class 
of any equity security (other than an exempted 
security) which is registered pursuant to section 78l of 
this title, or who is a director or an officer of the issuer 
of such security, shall file the statements required by 
this subsection with the Commission.7
Thus, the ten percent shareholding threshold applies only to 
“beneficial owners” who are not directors or officers.8 Section 16(b), 
which is the relevant statute in the case at hand, reads in part: “any 
profit realized by [a beneficial owner, director, or officer] from any 
purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of 
[an] issuer . . . within any period of less than six months . . . shall 
inure to and be recoverable by the issuer . . . .”9 The statute allows 
suit to be brought by either the issuer or by an owner of the issuer’s 
employees—buy and sell stock in their own companies.  
When corporate insiders trade in their own securities, they 
must report their trades to the SEC. . . . 
Illegal insider trading refers generally to buying or 
selling a security, in breach of a fiduciary duty or other 
relationship of trust and confidence, while in possession of 
material, nonpublic information about the security.
Education, Fast Answers: Insider Trading, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2013).
7 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(1).
8 A “beneficial owner” is the actual owner of the shares who holds voting 
power.  17 C.F.R. § 240.13d–3 (2013).  For details on what qualifies as a registered 
stock, see 15 U.S.C. § 78l.
9 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
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shares.10 The statute sets the statute of limitations to no more than 
two years after a profit was made.11
Simmonds brought to the Supreme Court, among other topics 
for debate, the issue of whether the statute of limitations set by 
section 16(b) can be tolled. 12 The well-established purpose of a 
statute of limitations is “to protect defendants against stale or unduly 
delayed claims.” 13 The equitable tolling doctrine is a judicially 
created doctrine that essentially tolls the statute of limitations to 
protect a person from fraudulent concealment of an unlawful act.14
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in this case, the 
following three-way split existed among courts across the country: 
(1) no application of equitable tolling (e.g., District Court for the 
Eastern District of Tennessee); (2) application of generally 
established principles of equitable tolling (e.g., Delaware State Court 
of Chancery); and (3) application of an altered principle of equitable 
tolling (e.g., Ninth and Second Circuits).15 The Court’s decision in 
Simmonds essentially narrows the scope by eliminating the third 
method.16 The Court’s opinion on the issue of whether equitable 
tolling even applies at all is less satisfactory, as it merely assumed 
tolling only for the purpose of determining the narrower issue of 
whether the Ninth Circuit’s rationale was valid or not.17 The opinion, 
although divided and without precedential effect, affirms the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of the petitioner’s 
“contention that § 16(b) establishes a period of repose that is not 
subject to tolling.”18
10 Id.; see also infra Part II.B.2.
11 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
12 See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1417 
(2012).
13 Id. at 1420 (citing John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 
130, 133 (2008)).
14 See infra Part II.C–D for an in-depth discussion of the equitable tolling 
doctrine.
15 See infra Part II.D.1. 
16 Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. at 1418, 1421 n.7; see infra Part II.D.1.a.
17 Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. at 1419, 1421.
18 Id. at 1421.
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This case note will focus on the non-precedential, yet 
important, decision made in Simmonds.  Because Supreme Court 
decisions carry the utmost authority, it essentially leaves only one 
option for circuit courts—case-by-case review under the traditional 
equitable tolling doctrine.  However, because the Court made certain 
to explicitly state that its decision on whether section 16(b)’s time 
limit is a limitation or a repose carries no precedent, lower courts 
have been left with the freedom to ascertain for themselves 
congressional intent on the matter. 
Part II of this case note will lay out the applicable statutes and 
judicial principles, examining how the courts have applied them to 
their decisions prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Simmonds.
Parts III and IV will comment on the relevant facts of the case 
and the issues brought up in the lower court proceedings, then move 
on to the Court’s opinion—including the level of deference the Court 
has afforded congressional intent when analyzing section 16(b) and 
the Court’s rationale in eliminating the prevalent third school of 
thought (altered principle) on equitable tolling.  These sections will 
also explain the implications of the Court’s decision to focus on 
certain issues and not others. 
Part V of this note will follow with an analysis of the reaction
from the legal community and other related industries, and will 
examine how the Simmonds decision has impacted the circuit courts 
in applying the relevant statutes and principles.  Then the section will 
review Supreme Court findings in related or similar circumstances—
namely, the Court’s rationale regarding application of equitable 
tolling for section 10(b) antifraud claims under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934—and review the circuit court decisions 
subsequent to Simmonds, in order to assess what the circuit split may 
be in the future and how the Supreme Court might rule if the same 
issue were to come up at a later date.  The note will also review 
important congressional reactions enacted subsequent to the Supreme 
Court holdings on equitable tolling for section 10(b) claims in order 
to assess legislative intent for statute of limitations in securities law 
and whether the Court correctly identified such intent.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Pre-Federal Securities Legislation Era
The Supreme Court has stated that “[c]orporations are 
creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate 
directors on the understanding that, except where federal law 
expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to 
stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the 
corporation.”19 Today, state laws continue to govern many aspects 
related to corporations—for example, corporate governance.  
However, after state laws proved lacking, the area of securities 
regulations received express federal governance.
1. State Blue Sky Laws
Blue Sky Laws are securities laws enacted by individual 
states.20 These laws originated before Congress passed the Securities 
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or even before 
Congress formed a centralized commission to oversee the securities 
markets. 21 The prominence of questionable securities-related 
practices became the impetus for regulating the promotion of 
“fraudulently valued securities.”22 In 1911, the state of Kansas first 
passed a securities act in this respect, which attracted the attention of 
other states and was “popularly called a ‘blue sky law[].’”23 These 
19 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (emphasis 
added).
20 Education, Fast Answers: Blue Sky Laws, U.S. SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers/bluesky.htm (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2013).
21 See infra note 23 and accompanying text; see also infra Part II.B.
22 ROBERT W. HAMILTON, JONATHAN R. MACEY & DOUGLAS K. MOLL,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 304–05 (11th ed. 2010).
23 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 4 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 27:3 (3d ed. 2010). The term “blue sky law” derives itself from 
the “purpose to protect the Kansas farmers against the industrialists selling them a 
piece of the blue sky.”  HAMILTON, MACEY & MOLL, supra note 22, at 305.
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state securities laws, now in effect in all the states, “protect investors 
against issuers having nothing behind their securities but water or 
blue sky.” 24 Blue Sky Laws attempt to “prevent unscrupulous 
dealers foisting on inexperienced persons unfair, spurious, and 
worthless securities, and further to provide some method of 
supervision and regulation of the marketplace.”25
Despite these attempts to prevent fraudulent securities 
transactions at the state level, these laws have not been very effective 
on a national level. 26 The state laws “required that all securities 
registered thereunder ‘qualify’ on a merit basis,” and for a while this 
“broad regulatory potential” approach pushed back federal 
involvement until the Wall Street crash of 1929.27
2. The Beginnings of Federal Involvement in the Regulatory 
Landscape
After the 1929 crash, Congress passed the Securities Act of 
1933 (1933 Act), also known as the “Truth in Securities” Act. 28
Congress had considered and rejected the “merit approach” of the 
state blue sky laws, “opting instead for a system of full disclosure” 
under the theory “that investors are adequately protected if all . . .
24 COX & HAZEN, supra note 23, at § 27:3:
As one court put it: “The name that is given to the law 
indicates the evil at which it is aimed, that is, ‘speculative 
schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of “blue
sky’’’; or, as [it has been] stated, . . . ‘to stop the sale of stock 
in fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold 
mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations.”’
Id. (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
25 Id.
26 HAMILTON, MACEY & MOLL, supra note 22, at 305.
27 Id. The crash of the stock market in 1929, which marked the beginning 
of the ten-year era known as The Great Depression, was “viewed as the straw that 
broke the camel’s back.”  Id.
28 Id.
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aspects of the securities being marketed are fully and fairly disclosed 
and thus there is no need for the more time-consuming merit analysis 
of the securities being offered.”29 The Federal Trade Commission 
administered this “limited” act until Congress passed the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 the next year.30
B. Adoption of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Section 16’s 
Prohibition of Insider Trading
After enactment of the 1933 Act, which governed the 
registration of securities to “enable[] investors . . . to make informed 
judgments about whether to purchase a company’s securities,” 31
Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) and 
simultaneously created the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC).32 The 1934 Act grants the SEC “broad authority over all 
aspects of the securities industry”—it “identifies and prohibits certain 
29 Id.
30 Id. Although the 1933 Act contained both “private remedies for
investors who are injured due to violations” and “general anti-fraud provisions 
which bar material omissions and misrepresentations in connection with the sale of 
securities,” it was limited because it only addressed “distributions of securities” and 
protected only those investors who were “purchasers of securities.”  Id. at 305–06. 
31 About the SEC, The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml 
(last visited Oct. 23, 2013) [hereinafter The Laws that Govern the Securities 
Industry].
32 Id.; see also HAMILTON, MACEY & MOLL, supra note 22, at 306 
(footnotes omitted):
In 1934 Congress enacted the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 which is a more omnibus regulation.  The extent 
of the regulation was so vast that Congress felt it was not 
possible to continue overburdening the Federal Trade 
Commission with this new administrative responsibility and 
thus established the Securities and Exchange Commission 
[“SEC”] which is now one of the largest federal agencies.  The 
Exchange Act of 1934 is directed at regulating all aspects of 
public trading of securities.
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types of conduct in the [securities] markets and provides the [SEC] 
with disciplinary powers over regulated entities and persons 
associated with them.”33 The SEC’s self-proclaimed mission is “to 
protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and 
facilitate capital formation.”34 In order to fulfill its dual purpose of 
(1) “promot[ing] stability in the markets” and (2) “protect[ing] 
investors,” the SEC oversees those who participate in securities 
transactions in order to maintain fair dealings and prevent fraud.35
1. Insider Trading Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934
One of the enumerated types of conduct prohibited by the Act 
of 1934 is insider trading.36 The SEC homepage offers insight into 
the commission’s description of insider trading:
The securities laws broadly prohibit fraudulent 
activities of any kind in connection with the offer, 
purchase, or sale of securities.  These provisions are 
the basis for many types of disciplinary actions, 
including actions against fraudulent insider trading.  
Insider trading is illegal when a person trades a 
security while in possession of material nonpublic 
information in violation of a duty to withhold the 
information or refrain from trading.37
33 The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 31.
34 About the SEC, What We Do, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Oct. 23, 
2013) [hereinafter What We Do].
35 Id.
36 The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 31.
37 Id.
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Despite the fact that the SEC clearly states that protection of 
investors is its most important mission, 38 one will not find an 
“express statutory prohibition” of insider trading in the Securities 
Acts.39 As a result, “most insider trading cases are based on Rule 
10b-5’s general antifraud provisions, which do not specifically 
mention insider trading.”40 There are three sections in the 1934 Act 
that expressly address insider trading, but on a limited scope.  Of 
those, section 16(b) prohibits “short swing profit by designated 
statutory insiders.”41 The other sections only address remedies for 
insider trading, but remain silent on the “substantive question of what 
types of conduct comprise improper trading of nonpublic 
information.”42
38 “Congress established the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1934 
to enforce the newly-passed securities laws, to promote stability in the markets and, 
most importantly, to protect investors.”  What We Do, supra note 34 (emphasis 
added).
39 4 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION § 12.17 (6th ed. 2009).
40 Id.
41 Id.; see also supra Part I and text accompanying note 9.
42 HAZEN, supra note 39. Section 20A(a) designates a private right of 
action against contemporaneous trading based on inside information:
Any person who violates any provision of this title or 
the rules or regulations thereunder by purchasing or selling a 
security while in possession of material, non-public 
information shall be liable in an action in any court of 
competent jurisdiction to any person who, contemporaneously 
with the purchase or sale of securities that is the subject of 
such violation, has purchased (where such violation is based 
on a sale of securities) or sold (where such violation is based 
on a purchase of securities) securities of the same class.
15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (2012).  Classes of securities are “[t]ypes of listed company stock 
that are differentiated by the level of voting rights shareholders receive.”  
Dictionary, Class of Shares, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/class.asp (last visited Mar. 18, 2013).  
Section 21A(a)(1) addresses the SEC’s authority to seek civil penalties for insider 
trading:
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2. Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Section 16 is a “regulatory framework enacted by Congress to 
proscribe the use of confidential information by corporate insiders in 
the trading of equity of their issuers.43 The section specifically deals 
with a narrow subset of “stock trading often associated with the 
misuse of inside information—short-swing trading.”44
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any 
person has violated any provision of this title or the rules or 
regulations thereunder by purchasing or selling a security or 
security-based swap agreement while in possession of 
material, nonpublic information in, or has violated any such 
provision by communicating such information in connection 
with, a transaction on or through the facilities of a national 
securities exchange or from or through a broker or dealer, and 
which is not part of a public offering by an issuer of securities 
other than standardized options or security futures products, 
the Commission—
(A) may bring an action in a United States district 
court to seek, and the court shall have jurisdiction to 
impose, a civil penalty to be paid by the person who 
committed such violation; and 
(B) may, subject to subsection (b)(1), bring an action 
in a United States district court to seek, and the court 
shall have jurisdiction to impose, a civil penalty to be 
paid by a person who, at the time of the violation, 
directly or indirectly controlled the person who 
committed such violation.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a)(1).
43 15 U.S.C. § 78p.
44 ALAN PALMITER & FRANK PARTNOY, CORPORATIONS: A
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 891 (2010).  Short-swing trading is a “purchase and 
resale . . . of company stock within a relatively short period of time.”  Id.  The 
original rationale for the six-month period defining “short-swing” in the provision 
comes from the fact that the “capital gains period of the tax laws was then six 
months, [so] there was good reason to suspect that . . . someone . . . who bought 
and sold within six months,” foregoing tax advantages for longer-held profits, “was 
doing so to take advantage of some special knowledge.”  Id.
 
                                                                                                                                      
Fall 2013 Missing the Mark 821
Section 16 seeks to prevent such abuses of inside information 
by means of a threefold attack.45 Section 16(a) requires insiders to 
make SEC filings of shareholding and transactions; section 16(b) 
creates a private cause of action for the issuer or shareholder to bring 
a claim to recover the “short-swing” profits made by insiders; and 
section 16(c) “prohibits such insiders from transacting short sales in 
the issuer’s equity securities.”46 Through such a threefold attack, 
Congress intended to “curb the evils of insider trading [by] . . . taking 
the profits out of a class of transactions in which the possibility of 
abuse was believed to be intolerably great.” 47 Section 16(b) 
explicitly states that the purpose of the section is to “prevent[] the 
unfair use of information which may have been obtained . . . by 
reason of [a] relationship to the issuer” for short-swing profits.48
45 Marc I. Steinberg & Daryl L. Landsdale, Jr., The Judicial and 
Regulatory Constriction of Section 16(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 33, 34 (1992).
46 Id. at 34.
47 Id. at 36 (quoting Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 
418, 422 (1972)).  The Supreme Court in Reliance held that the only effective 
method is a “flat rule.”  404 U.S. at 422; see also Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 
693 (7th Cir. 1970) (holding that strict liability applies regardless of intent).
48 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).  
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of 
information which may have been obtained by such beneficial 
owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the 
issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, 
or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer 
(other than an exempted security) . . . within any period of less 
than six months, unless such security . . . was acquired in good 
faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall 
inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any 
intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or 
officer in entering into such transaction . . . .  Suit to recover 
such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of 
competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any 
security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if 
the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty 
days after the request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the 
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a. Standard of Application of Section 16(b)
The correct standard to apply when analyzing a claim under 
section 16(b) is the objective approach—“where alternative 
constructions of the terms of § 16(b) are possible, those terms are to 
be given the construction that best serves the congressional purpose 
of curbing short-swing speculation by corporate insiders”49—unless 
the circumstances represent a borderline situation that calls for a 
subjective and pragmatic approach—“courts inquire whether the 
transaction involved carries a potential for insider abuse.  Only those 
types of transactions which do are then found included within the 
statutory scope.”50 But otherwise, for “garden-variety transaction[s] 
which cannot be regarded as unorthodox, the pragmatic approach is 
not applicable.”51
b. Section 16(b)’s Two-Year Statute of Limitations
Section 16(b)’s private right of action also contains a 
prescribed time limitation: “no such suit shall be brought more than 
two years after the date such profit was realized.”52 This portion of 
the statute is the central issue in Simmonds, which the Supreme Court 
addressed before considering the merits of the case.  Can this statute 
of limitations be tolled, and if so, when does the clock begin to run?
same thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought more than 
two years after the date such profit was realized.
Id. (emphasis added).
49 See Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 522 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(quoting Reliance, 404 U.S. at 424), abrogated by Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC 
v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414 (2012)) (citation omitted).
50 Whittaker, 639 F.2d at 522 (quoting Kern Cnty. Land Co. v. Occidental 
Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 594–95 (1973)).
51 Id.
52 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
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c. The Underwriter Exemption to Section 16(b)
The SEC “has relaxed a number of rules in this area” 
regarding section 16(b) claims. 53 This includes relaxing rules 
regarding: (1) an insider’s exercise of an option and immediate sale 
of underlying security after the six-month holding period, and (2) the 
purchase or sale by an “individual before . . . [becoming] an officer 
or director and the subsequent offsetting transaction after such person 
attains insider status.”54
Regarding underwriters, “The SEC has carved out an 
underwriter exemption to both disclosure under 16(a) and 
disgorgement under 16(b) . . . when acting in good faith and in the 
ordinary course of business.”55 The “underwriter exemption,” as it 
has come to be known, originated in 1935 under a rule called NB2 
that exempted “certain transactions by underwriters from the 
provisions of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.”56 The 
conditions of this exemption were relaxed on several occasions,57 and 
the current exemption standard can be found under 17 C.F.R. § 
240.16a-7(a) for exemption from 16(a) disclosures,58 and under 17 
53 Steinberg & Landsdale, supra note 45, at 38.
54 See id.
55 Boris Rappoport, Discovering Concealment: Defining the Limits of 
Equitable Tolling in Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 7 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 171, 172 (2012), available at
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/djclpp_sidebar/85/ (describing the reasons that the 
SEC has given for the exemptions in this section).
56 Exchange Act Release No. 264, 1935 WL 29156, at *1 (June 8, 1935).
57 See ARNOLD S. JACOBS, 5A DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE 
SECURITIES LAWS § 4:202 (2005); see also Exchange Act Release No. 535, 1936 
WL 31535 (Mar. 19, 1936); Amendment to Rule NB2, Exchange Act Release No. 
1080, 1937 WL 31412 (Feb. 27, 1937); Exchange Act Release No. 3907, 1947 WL 
25432 (Jan. 29, 1947); Exchange Act Release No. 4719 (June 18, 1952); Adoption 
of Amendments, Exchange Act Release No. 4754, 1952 WL 47481 (Sept. 24, 
1952); Exchange Act Release No. 6103, 1959 WL 7138 (Oct. 29, 1959); Exchange 
Act Release No. 6131, 1959 WL 7166 (Dec. 4, 1959).
58 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-7(a) (2013).  The provision exempts anyone 
“engaged in the business of distributing securities” who participates in a 
“distribution of a substantial block of securities” as long as he or she “participat[es] 
in good faith, in the ordinary course of such business.”  Id. § 240.16a-7(a)(1).
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C.F.R. § 240.16a-10 for exemption from section 16(b): “Except as 
provided in § 240.16a-6, any transaction exempted from the 
requirements of section 16(a) of the Act, insofar as it is otherwise 
subject to the provisions of section 16(b), shall be likewise exempt 
from section 16(b) of the Act.”59
The original suit in Simmonds involved a challenge to this 
exemption.60 However, the Supreme Court did not reach the merits 
of this challenge due to its ruling on the statute of limitations and 
equitable tolling.61
C. The Equitable Tolling Doctrine
The equitable tolling doctrine is a judicially created 
principle.62 The doctrine attempts to harmonize the two contrasting 
policy considerations of minimizing unfairness arising from: (1) the 
bar that the statute of limitations places on litigants acting with a 
good faith effort; and (2) outdated and stale claims that should have, 
and could have, been brought at an earlier time. 63 However, to 
mitigate an influx of claims under such an “extraordinary remedy,” 
both the legislative and judicial branches have “limited [it] to rare 
and exceptional circumstances” and “applied [it] sparingly.”64 To 
understand the doctrine, it is necessary not only to address the 
59 Id. § 240.16a-10.
60 See infra Part III.A–B for a detailed discussion of the claims brought by 
Simmonds against the underwriters.
61 See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1419 
(2012).
62 Arivella v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 164, 176 (D. Mass. 
2009).
63 Machules v. Dep’t of Admin., 523 So. 2d 1132, 1134 (Fla. 1988) (“The 
tolling doctrine is used in the interests of justice to accommodate both a 
defendant’s right not to be called upon to defend a stale claim and a plaintiff's right 
to assert a meritorious claim when equitable circumstances have prevented a timely 
filing.”); see also Naton v. Bank of Cal., 649 F.2d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(explaining that “equitable tolling . . . focuses on the plaintiff's excusable ignorance 
of the limitations period and on lack of prejudice to the defendant.”).
64 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 134 (2010) (footnote omitted).
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doctrine’s principles, but to briefly touch upon the principles of 
equitable estoppel, statute of limitations, statute of repose, and the 
application of the doctrine by federal and state legislatures.
1. Origin and General Application
Equitable tolling is judicially created;65 nevertheless it “has a 
legal basis arising out of common law.”66 It “permits a plaintiff to 
sue after the statutory time period has expired if he or she has been 
prevented from doing so due to inequitable circumstances.”67 In the 
case of fraud, the clock does not start to tick for a statute of 
limitations until “discovery of the fraud ‘where the party injured by 
the fraud remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of 
diligence or care on his part.’”68
The burden of persuasion lies with the party seeking 
application of equitable tolling, where the party must “establish a 
compelling basis for awarding such relief.” 69 This “compelling 
basis” standard attaches a narrow standard and safeguards against 
overextending the doctrine. 70 Courts determine whether or not to 
apply the doctrine with a case-by-case review.71
In Pace v. DiGuglielmo, the Supreme Court set the prima 
facie case for the equitable tolling doctrine to apply.72 The Court 
65 Arivella, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 176.
66 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 153 (2011). 
67 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 134 (footnote omitted).
68 Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1420 
(2012) (quoting Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 
350, 363 (1991)). 
69 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 134 (footnote omitted).  Sufficient 
basis have included “when the plaintiff has been mislead [sic] or lulled into 
inaction, has in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his or her 
rights, or has timely asserted his or her rights mistakenly in the wrong forum.”  Id. 
(footnote omitted); see also Nicks v. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l, etc., 957 So. 2d 65 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
70 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 134.
71 Id.
72 544 U.S. 408 (2005).
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concluded that “[g]enerally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears 
the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been 
pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 
circumstance stood in his way.” 73 In instances of fraudulent 
concealment of facts, equitable tolling “ceases when those facts are, 
or should have been, discovered by the plaintiff.”74
2. Equitable Tolling and Equitable Estoppel
The main difference between equitable tolling and equitable 
estoppel lies in the fact that the tolling doctrine does not require any 
fault or wrongful conduct by the defendant.75 Although it is often the 
case that a plaintiff does not discover the facts for a cause of action 
because of some sort of fraudulent misconduct on the part of the 
defendant, the tolling doctrine applies equally for other reasons 
unrelated to the defendant’s conduct.76 On the other hand, equitable 
estoppel is “intended to prevent a party from taking unconscionable 
advantage of its own wrong.” 77 The equitable estoppel doctrine 
“always presupposes error on one side and fault or fraud upon the 
73 Id. at 418.
74 Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1420 
(2012) (citing 2 CALVIN W. CORMAN, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS § 9.7.1, at 55–57
(1991)).
75 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 134.
76 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitations of Actions § 154 (2011).  For example, the 
doctrine 
[P]ermits a court to excuse a plaintiff's failure to comply with 
a statute of limitations where because of disability, 
irremediable lack of information, or other circumstances 
beyond his or her control, the plaintiff cannot reasonably be 
expected to file suit on time.  Accordingly, ignorance of a 
statutory deadline based on lack of notice or inadequate notice 
may provide a proper basis for equitable tolling. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).
77 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 29.
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other and some defect of which it would be inequitable for the party 
against whom the doctrine is asserted to take advantage.”78
3. Statute of Limitations and Statute of Repose
The Corpus Juris Secundum differentiates the statute of 
limitations from the statute of repose in the following simple 
distinction: “A statute of limitations governs the time within which 
an action must be commenced after the cause of action accrues.  A 
statute of repose, however, limits the time within which an action 
may be brought and is not related to the accrual of any cause of 
action . . . .”79 Although they are similar concepts in affording the 
defendant some respite from having an action brought against him or 
her after a prescribed time period, the difference in determination of 
when the clock should start to tick provides a very stark contrast—
“Unlike an ordinary statute of limitations, which begins running upon 
accrual of the claim, the period specified in a statute of repose begins 
when a specific event occurs, regardless of whether a cause of action 
has accrued or whether any injury has resulted.”80 Thus, for a statute 
of repose, the “injury need not have occurred, much less have been 
discovered.”81
Simply put, a statute of limitations bars a plaintiff from 
bringing a claim if it is not brought within a prescribed time period, 
whereas a statute of repose bars a claim if it is not brought after a
prescribed time period—the former is a conditional statute while the 
latter is an absolute statute.82 Therefore, it is crucial to determine 
whether the prescribed period of time in a statute is intended to be 
one or the other for equitable tolling purposes. A finding of repose 
will completely bar a potential plaintiff from bringing a stale or 
78 Id. § 28 (footnote omitted).
79 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 7 (2010) (footnote omitted).
80 Id. (footnote omitted).
81 Id. (footnote omitted).
82 Id.
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outdated claim, no matter how unfair it may be for the diligent 
plaintiff.83
4. Application to Statutes and Legislative Intent
Generally, it has been stated that application of equitable 
tolling to a statute depends on underlying policies:
[E]quitable tolling of a statute of limitations is 
appropriate when consistent with the policies 
underlying the statute and the purposes underlying the 
statute of limitations, and equitable tolling is not 
permissible if it is inconsistent with the text of the 
relevant statute.  Even in the absence of an explicit 
prohibition on equitable tolling of the statute of 
limitations, a court may conclude that either the text of 
the statute or a manifest legislative policy underlying 
it cannot be reconciled with permitting equitable 
tolling.84
In Rotella v. Wood, the Supreme Court stated, “federal 
statutes of limitations are generally subject to equitable principles of 
tolling.”85 In a subsequent case, the Court explained, “Congress must 
be presumed to draft limitations periods in light of this background 
principle” of equitable tolling, especially when it is enacting 
limitations to be applied by bankruptcy courts, which are courts of 
equity that apply the principles and rules of equity jurisprudence.86
Factors for assessing whether a certain statute of limitations has 
assumed the presumption of equitable tolling include, but are not 
limited to: “(1) the statute’s detail, (2) its technical language, (3) its 
83 Id.
84 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 153 (2011) (footnotes omitted).
85 528 U.S. 549, 560 (2000); see also 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions §
134.
86 Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49–50 (2002); see also 54 C.J.S.
Limitations of Actions § 134.
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multiple iterations of the limitations period in procedural and 
substantive form, (4) its explicit inclusion of exceptions, and (5) its 
underlying subject matter.”87 And so, although federal statutes of 
limitations are presumed to apply equitable tolling, each statute 
should be carefully reviewed to determine whether Congress wished 
to exclude the statute from this general principle.  
For claims regarding the federal securities laws, the statute of 
limitations begins to run from the offer, sale, or delivery by the 
defendant, whichever occurred last.88 Although Congress has clearly 
expressed its intent in other areas of securities law, 89 it has 
unfortunately remained silent as to section 16(b)’s statute of 
limitations and tolling—“No congressional debate exists on the 
statute of limitations provision since it was inserted in the conference 
report.”90
D. Historical Application of Equitable Tolling to Section 16(b) 
Claims in the Federal Courts
This section will first address the methods of equitable tolling 
applied by different Circuit Courts regarding section 16(b) 
litigation—notably, the Ninth and Second Circuits.  Then the section 
will discuss the Supreme Court’s application of equitable tolling 
principles to other areas of federal law before moving to a discussion 
of the facts and holdings of Simmonds in Part III.91
87 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 134 (footnote omitted).
88 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 287; see also Doran v. Petroleum 
Mgmt. Corp., 576 F.2d 91, 93 (5th Cir. 1978) (“The relevant inquiry was which of 
the defendant's activities—offer, sale, or delivery—occurred last as that was the 
time from which to measure the limitation period.”).
89 See infra Part V.C for a discussion of the Court’s interpretation of the 
Rule 10b-5 anti-fraud statute and Congress’s subsequent enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which manifested legislative intent as to the statute of 
limitations/repose for Rule 10b-5.
90 1 ARNOLD S. JACOBS, SECTION 16 OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT §
3:52 (2011) (footnote omitted).
91 The Supreme Court has addressed other issues regarding section 16(b), 
but it did not address the issue of equitable tolling for this provision until 2012 in 
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1. Lower Court Three-Way Split
Traditionally, three schools of thought have been established 
regarding the equitable tolling doctrine’s application to section 16(b) 
claims: 
(1) the two-year period runs strictly from the time the 
profits were realized, without any tolling; (2) the two-
year period is tolled until the corporation ha[s] 
sufficient information to put it on notice of its 
potential section 16(b) claim; and (3) the “disclosure 
rationale,” namely, that the two-year period is tolled
until the insider discloses the transactions at issue by 
filing the required section 16(a) reports.92
In Chambliss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp., the plaintiff shareholders 
brought a claim under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act. 93 Among 
other things, the plaintiff brought claim under
78p because the transaction . . . was effectively a 
‘buying’ by the Class ‘B’ stockholders (and 
specifically by defendant Mashburn, an owner of more 
than 10 percentum . . . .  The transaction was not
reported to the Securities Exchange Commission, and 
the profit realized by the buyers has not been reported 
to such Commission.94
However, the statute of limitations for the Securities Acts 
ranges from one to three years.95 Thus, the 6th Circuit affirmed the 
Simmonds. See Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 123–24 (1991) (analyzing the 
terms “security,” “issuer,” and “instituted” within the provision).
92 Steinberg & Landsdale, supra note 45, at 55 (footnotes omitted).
93 414 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1969), aff’g 274 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Tenn. 1967).
94 Chambliss, 274 F. Supp. at 407 (quotation marks omitted).
95 See infra note 195.
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District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee’s ruling96 that the 
“limitation periods provided in the federal securities acts cited herein 
are not tolled, for the purpose of an action filed at least fifteen 
months and as much as thirty-nine months after the expiration of 
such limitations periods, by the commencement of a prior action 
within such limitations periods . . . .”97
a. Ninth and Second Circuit Courts’ Decisions on Section 16(b) 
Equitable Tolling
Out of the thirteen circuit courts to have considered these 
issues, the Second and Ninth Circuit generally carry more supportive 
authority than the other circuits.98 An excerpt from The Leadership 
Conference on Civil and Human Rights’ website nicely summarizes 
the Ninth Circuit’s influence: 
The Ninth Circuit is comprised of nine 
states—California, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, 
Idaho, Arizona, Montana, Alaska, and Hawaii.  Fifty-
96 Chambliss, 414 F.2d at 257.
97 Chambliss, 274 F. Supp. at 411.
98 See infra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.  This is true, aside from 
the D.C. Circuit. Although all Court of Appeals are on the same “level,” some are 
considered more influential than others: 
The D.C. Circuit Court is generally considered the second most 
powerful court (behind only the U.S. Supreme Court) in the 
nation.  The D.C. Circuit Court plays a critical role in national 
security matters, has considerable regulatory review authority, 
and is frequently a springboard for judges that are later 
nominated to the Supreme Court. 
Nathanael Bennet, Senate to Consider Controversial Judicial Nominee While No 
One is Watching, ACLJ  (Dec. 5, 2011, 10:47 AM), http://aclj.org/us-
constitution/senate-consider-controversial-judicial-nominee-no-one-watching.  
Indeed, four of the current Justices of the Supreme Court hail from the D.C. 
Circuit—Justices Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Chief Justice Roberts. See Carl 
Tobias, Now Hiring: A Few Good Judges, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Feb. 15, 
2013), http://prospect.org/article/now-hiring-few-good-judges.
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four million Americans live in the states within the 
Ninth Circuit's jurisdiction—more than any other 
circuit.  This means that one in six Americans is 
potentially affected by the court’s rulings.99
The Second Circuit includes New York, where many 
financial institutions are headquartered, thus making it the authority 
when it comes to securities law.100 For the foregoing reasons (as well 
as the fact that the present case was appealed from the Ninth Circuit), 
it would be wise to discuss these courts’ application standards.
In contrast to Chambliss, the Ninth Circuit and Second Circuit 
have applied tolling to section 16(b) claims—but with a variation on 
the established methods of traditional equitable tolling. 101 In 
Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., the Court of Appeal for the Ninth 
Circuit held that a section 16(b) statute of limitations is “tolled until 
the insider discloses the transactions at issue in his mandatory section 
16(a) reports,” regardless of whether the plaintiff knew or should 
have known of the conduct at issue. 102 The Supreme Court 
commented on the difference between this Ninth Circuit ruling, 
commonly called the “Whittaker rule,” and conventional equitable 
99 The Crucial Importance of the Ninth Circuit, THE LEADERSHIP 
CONFERENCE ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Apr. 14, 2003), 
http://www.civilrights.org/judiciary/courts/ninth-circuit.html.
100 See Roberta S. Karmel, The Second Circuit's Role in Expanding the 
SEC's Jurisdiction Abroad, 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 743, 743 (1991). The article 
states: 
The Second Circuit has had such a profound impact 
on securities law that it has been referred to in this context as 
the “Mother Court.”  The breadth and significance of Second 
Circuit securities law decisions is not surprising.  New York 
City is the financial center of both the United States and the 
securities industry, and its legal advisors are located there.
Id. (footnote omitted). 
101 See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text.
102 639 F.2d 516, 527 (9th Cir. 1981), abrogated by Credit Suisse Sec. 
(USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414 (2012).
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tolling by stating that “some federal courts have used [the] term 
[‘legal tolling’] to describe [the Whittaker rule] on the ground that the 
rule ‘is derived from a statutory source,’ whereas equitable tolling is 
‘judicially created.’”103
In Litzler v. CC Investments, L.D.C., the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit stated, “We now hold that tolling of the 
limitations period in Section 16(b), . . . using the relevant grace 
periods of Section 16(a)(2) . . . is appropriate when a defendant has 
failed to comply with the reporting requirements of Section 16(a).”104
The Second Circuit further stated that, “tolling should continue only 
until the claimant or . . . the company gets actual notice that a person 
subject to Section 16(a) has realized specific short-swing profits that 
are worth pursuing.”105
b. Delaware’s Treatment of Equitable Tolling
Delaware is a particularly important state when it comes to 
the law regarding corporations, business transactions, and 
securities—Delaware has a separate Court of Chancery that “deals 
largely with corporate issues, trusts, estates, other fiduciary matters, 
disputes involving the purchase of land and questions of title to real 
estate as well as commercial and contractual matters.”106 Delaware 
became the favored state of incorporation largely due to its 
“hospitable climate for corporations.” 107 Because of Delaware’s 
103 Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1419 n.6 (quoting Arivella v. Lucent 
Techs., Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 164, 176 (D. Mass. 2009)).
104 362 F.3d 203, 207 (2d Cir. 2004), abrogated by Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 
1414 (2012) (citations omitted).
105 Litzler, 362 F.3d at 208 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
106 Overview, DELAWARE STATE COURTS,
http://courts.delaware.gov/overview.stm (last visited Oct. 23, 2013).
107 HAMILTON, MACEY & MOLL, supra note 22, at 141.  The book quotes 
former Chief Justice Veasey of the Delaware Supreme Court in describing 
Delaware’s current status in the corporate area:
Delaware has attracted over 300,000 corporations, including 
more than half of the Fortune 500 and half of the New York 
Stock Exchange corporations.  It has also attracted some of the 
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influence in business law applications, it would be informative to 
peer into the state’s decisions regarding tolling of the statute of 
limitations. 
For a plaintiff to toll a statute of limitations in Delaware, 
regardless of the theory on which the justification is based, “[the]
plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the statute was tolled,” and 
“no theory will toll the statute beyond the point where the plaintiff 
was objectively aware, or should have been aware, of facts giving 
rise to the wrong.”108 Thus, by adding the “should have been aware” 
standard, Delaware follows established principles of equitable 
tolling.109
2. The Supreme Court’s Past Application of Equitable Tolling
In Burnett v. New York Central Railway Co.,110 the Supreme 
Court stated that
[t]he basic question to be answered in determining 
whether, under a given set of facts, a statute of 
limitations is to be tolled, is one “of legislative intent 
whether the right shall be enforceable . . . after 
the prescribed time.” . . . [T]he basic inquiry is 
whether congressional purpose is effectuated by 
finest lawyers in America to our Bar.  The role of the Judiciary 
complements the outstanding work of the Bar, the General 
Assembly and the Secretary of State’s office. 
Id. at 143 (quoting E. Norman Veasey, The Drama of Judicial Branch Change in 
this Century, 17 DEL. LAW., Winter 1999/2000, at 4, 4, available at
http://delawarebarfoundation.org/delawyer/Volume17_Number4_Winter1999-
2000.pdf ). 
108 In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S’holder Litig., 919 A.2d 563, 585 
(Del. Ch. 2007) (footnote omitted).
109 See supra Part II.C.
110 380 U.S. 424 (1965). 
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tolling the statute of limitations in given 
circumstances.111
In Lampf, a group of investors filed complaints against a law 
firm under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and SEC Rule 10b-5.112
The plaintiffs claimed that regardless of whether state or federal 
limitation applies, “that period must be subject to the doctrine of 
equitable tolling.”113 Although this case mainly addressed the issue 
of whether state or federal periods of limitations apply to a private, 
implied claim114—with the plaintiffs asserting that state common-law 
fraud doctrines applied, and defendants arguing that federal-law 
limitations period applied 115—the Court addressed a second issue 
related to equitable tolling. 116 The Court stated that statute of 
limitations “requirements in law-suits . . . are customarily subject to 
‘equitable tolling.’”117 Thus, “in the usual case, ‘where the party 
injured by the fraud remains in ignorance of it without any fault or 
want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not 
begin to run until the fraud is discovered.’”118 However, the Court 
noted that “tolling principles do not apply” where there is a clear 
111 Id. at 426–27 (quoting Mid State Horticultural Co. v. Penn. R. Co, 320 
U.S. 356, 360 (1943)) (citations omitted).
112 Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow, 501 U.S. 350, 352 (1991); 
see also 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013). 
113 Lampf, 501 U.S. at 363.
114 These provisions also fall under the scope of insider trading rules, and 
are known as the Anti-Fraud Provisions.  See infra note 122.  At the time of this 
suit, “the claim asserted [was] one implied under a statute that also contains an 
express cause of action with its own time limitation.”  Lampf, 501 U.S. at 359 
(emphasis added).  Thus, the courts treated a private cause of action under Rule 
10b-5 as being implied with no express time limitation, giving rise to the debate on 
the applicable statute of limitations.  Id. at 353–54. 
115 Id. at 354.
116 Id. at 363.
117 Id. (quoting Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 
(1990)).
118 Lampf, 501 U.S. at 363 (quoting Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 348 
(1875)).
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legislative indication of a “cutoff” limitation in the statute.119 Thus, 
the Court found that Rule 10b-5 contained express language 
indicating both a statute of limitation and repose: “The 1-year period, 
by its terms, begins after discovery of the . . . violation, making 
tolling unnecessary.  The 3-year limit is a period of repose 
inconsistent with tolling.”120 For the Rule10b-5 claim brought in 
Lampf, the clear legislative intent for a period of repose set the claim 
apart from the “usual case.”121
The split decisions of the lower courts regarding section 16(b) 
and equitable tolling can be attributed to the ambiguity of the period 
of limitation stated within the rule, which is a marked contrast from 
the clear language of section 10(b).122 Section 10(b) offers two time 
limitations, thus making it clear that one is a statute of limitation, and 
the other is a statute of repose—an absolute cut-off date.  Unlike 
section 10(b), however, section 16(b) only indicates one period of 
limitation.  Thus, lower court decisions remained split as to whether 
equitable tolling applied to this period—namely, whether the two-
year period was a period of limitation or a period of repose.123
The current case answers the question of whether a claim 
under section 16(b) can be tolled until formal disclosures of short-
119 Id.
120 Id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).
121 Lampf, 501 U.S. at 363.
122 Section 10(b) is the antifraud provision of the 1934 Act.  See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78j(b) (2012).  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, passed in 2002 and expressly supplying 
intent of Congress regarding section 10(b), provides, in relevant part:
[A] private right of action that involves a claim of fraud, 
deceit, manipulation, or contrivance in contravention of a 
regulatory requirement concerning the securities laws . . . may 
be brought not later than the earlier of—
(1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting 
the violation; or 
(2) 5 years after such violation.
28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2006). 
123 See supra Part II.D.1.
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swing profits have been made pursuant to section 16(a) disclosure 
requirements. 124 But it still leaves open the issue of whether 
equitable tolling applies at all to section 16(b) claims—the Court was 
divided 4-to-4 on whether section 16(b) “establishes a period of 
repose that is not subject to tolling.” 125 Thus, this issue may be 
decided differently by a majority opinion in the future because this 
case carries no precedential effect.126
The Court has rejected the third school of thought—that the 
statute of limitations is tolled until a section 16(a) disclosure is 
made.127 But the Court’s language, with the majority opinion written 
by Justice Scalia—“we conclude that, even assuming that the 2-year 
period can be extended, the Ninth Circuit erred in determining that it 
is tolled until the filing of a § 16(a) statement”—gives no concrete 
conclusion about the application of equitable tolling.128 However, 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion focuses heavily on traditional
equitable tolling principles.129
Because of the even 4–4 split regarding whether the statutory 
period is one of limitation or of repose, the Simmonds decision has 
now brought the lower court split down to two schools of thought.130
However, although the opinion explicitly stated that there is no 
precedential effect, the Supreme Court, in affirming the Ninth 
Circuit’s application of equitable tolling, may have influenced the 
circuit courts to lean towards applying equitable tolling principles 
rather than going the other way.131 The next two Parts of this note 
124 See infra Part IV for a detailed discussion of the Court’s opinion 
regarding this issue.
125 Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1421 
(2012).
126 Id.
127 See id. at 1419; see also infra Part IV.  The Court unanimously agreed 
on this holding with an 8–0 decision (Chief Justice Roberts did not participate).
128 See Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. at 1419.
129 See infra Part IV.
130 Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. at 1421.
131 Id.
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will relay the facts of Simmonds and analyze the Supreme Court’s 
decision and findings. 132
III. FACTS
A. Factual Allegations
This case originated in 2007 when respondent Vanessa 
Simmonds filed fifty-five section 16(b) claims against several 
financial institutions, including Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, 
which had acted as underwriters for initial public offerings (IPOs) of 
various companies.133 The “alleged factual basis for each of [the] 
complaints [was] that the Underwriter Defendants colluded with 
insiders of the [issuers] and certain investors in order to personally 
profit from underpriced IPOs.”134
Simmonds alleged that the following set of facts supported 
liability of the underwriters under section 16(b): (1) the underwriters 
were “statutory insiders” as beneficial owners of more than ten 
percent of the issuing companies’ stock; (2) the purchase and sale of 
shares took place in the “immediate aftermarket” of the IPO, thus not 
meeting the six-month limit; (3) there was a “large discrepancy 
between the amount . . . paid for the IPO stock and the amount . . . 
sold . . . in the immediate aftermarket”; and (4) the underwriters “had 
a pecuniary interest in these transactions because they ‘shar[ed] in the 
profits of the customers to whom they made IPO allocations of 
[issuer] stock’” and because they  “allocated ‘shares of [issuer] stock 
to executives and . . . insiders of other companies . . . from which 
[they] expected to receive new or additional investment banking 
business in return.’”135
132 See infra Parts III, IV.
133 Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. at 1418 (citations omitted).
134 In re Section 16(b) Litigation, 602 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1206 (W.D. 
Wash. 2009).
135 Id. at 1207 (alteration in original).  Simmonds’s claim that the 
underwriters owned more than ten percent of stock was based on the logic that “as 
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The underlying actions of the claims took place in the 1990s 
and 2000, but the lawsuit was not brought until 2007.136 Section 
16(b) claims are restricted by a statute of limitations of two years.137
Although Simmonds’s claims were made long after the alleged 
actions took place, “Simmonds alleged that the underwriters failed to 
comply with [the] requirement [of section 16(a)], thereby tolling 
[section] 16(b)’s 2-year time period.”138
B. Defenses Raised to the Allegations
In their brief to the Supreme Court, the petitioners asserted 
that Simmonds could not bring her suit for two reasons.  First, 
Simmonds’s actions were not timely, since section 16(b) promulgates 
a two-year repose period that is not to be extended.139 Second, even 
if the period could have been extended, the underwriter exemption 
applied, resulting in no requirement for the underwriters to have filed 
a section 16(a) disclosure.140
The petitioners asserted that the language of section 16(b) 
established precisely when the statute of limitations should have 
started to run: 
Section 16(b) by its plain terms specifies when the 
two-year time limit begins to run: on “the date such 
[short-swing] profit was realized.”  By selecting the 
a group, the underwriters and the insiders owned in excess of 10% of the 
outstanding stock during the relevant time period.”  Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. at 1418.
136 Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. at 1418.
137 See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012).
138 Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. at 1418 (footnote omitted).  Section 16(a) of the 
1934 Act requires insiders to disclose change in ownership interests.  15 U.S.C. § 
78p(a).  
139 Brief for Petitioners at v, Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414 (No. 10-1261) 
2011 WL 3678807, at *v.
140 Id. (No. 10-1261) at *35–*36.  The Court declined to address the
underwriter exemption, and “express[ed] no view on this issue.”  Simmonds, 132 S. 
Ct. at 1418 n.4.  Both the district court and the court of appeals also declined to 
address the issue.  See Simmonds v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 638 F.3d 1072, 
1086, 1096 (9th Cir. 2010).
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date the defendant engaged in challenged conduct, 
rather than the date the plaintiff discovered such 
conduct, as the trigger for the statutory time limit, 
Congress indicated that such discovery should not 
extend that limit.141
The petitioners supported their interpretation of congressional 
intent with other provisions of the Act and prior Supreme Court 
findings:
Congress confirmed the point in companion 
provisions . . . which look to a plaintiff’s discovery of 
the facts underlying a claim to shorten, not lengthen,
statutory time limits.  Indeed, by reference to these 
companion provisions, this Court already has 
characterized section 16(b)’s time limit as a “period of 
repose” that cannot be extended.142
The petitioners pled for reversal of the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision even if the Court were to find an extension of the two-year 
limit:
Under no circumstances is there any basis for 
extending that time limit beyond the point at which a 
reasonably diligent securities owner knew, or should 
have known, the facts underlying a Section 16(b) 
action. . . . Accordingly, regardless of whether this 
Court adopts either a “repose” approach or a “notice” 
141 Brief for Petitioners, Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414 (2012) (No. 10-1261) 
at *2 (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
142 Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting in part Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, 
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 360 n.5 (1991)).  In Lampf, the 
Supreme Court found that Rule 10b’s anti-fraud provision contained a statute of 
repose.  501 U.S. at 363.
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approach, 143 this Court should reverse the Ninth 
Circuit’s judgment.144
The petitioners in Simmonds also raised defenses against 
Simmonds’s allegations of underwriter liability: “[T]he SEC has 
carved out an ‘underwriter exemption’ to allow underwriters to keep 
profits from short-swing transactions in the context of public 
offerings of securities, even if Section 16(b) would otherwise cover 
the underwriting activity.” 145 Simmonds had claimed that the 
underwriters in the present suit worked with insiders of the issuing 
company and investors in order to gain personal profits from the 
IPO. 146 The petitioners acknowledged that the underwriter 
exemption applied only for “good faith” actions. 147 They offered 
their definition of “good faith” and alleged that Simmonds’s 
allegations did not meet this definition:148
Although the most natural reading of that term is 
that the underwriter exemption applies to all bona 
fide distributions of shares to the public, respondent 
[Simmonds] advanced a far more expansive view of 
the “good faith” exception to the underwriter 
exemption.  Thus, respondent attempted to “plead 
around” the underwriter exemption by alleging that 
petitioners “lacked good faith in connection with 
143 See Litzler v. CC Invs., L.D.C., 362 F.3d 203, 206–07 (2d Cir. 2004), 
abrogated by Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414 (2012) 
(adopting a version of the notice approach in its equitable tolling application).
144 Brief for Petitioners, Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414 (No. 10-1261) at *3.
145 Id. (No. 10-1261) at *6.
146 Id. (No. 10-1261) at *8; see also supra note 135 and accompanying 
text.
147 Id. (No. 10-1261) at *36 (“To be sure, that exemption applies only to 
‘good faith’ underwriting.”); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-7(a) (2013).
148 The SEC has not offered any authoritative interpretation of the term 
“good faith” as used in this context. Brief for Petitioners, Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 
1414 (No. 10-1261) at *36 (explaining that good faith is a “term that the SEC has 
never authoritatively construed”).
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their IPO underwriting and distribution activities” at 
issue in each lawsuit because of the underlying 
misconduct alleged.149
Thus, the petitioning underwriters asserted that (1) the 
statutory time limit for section 16(b) is a period of repose, rather than 
a limitation that can be tolled, and that (2) the underwriter exemption 
applied, thus making it impossible for the Ninth Circuit’s standard to 
be utilized, as that standard relied on section 16(a) disclosures that 
the underwriters were not required to make.
C. Lower Court Proceedings
1. Trial Court
Simmonds’s fifty-five claims were “consolidated for pretrial 
purposes.” 150 The United States District Court for the Western 
District of Washington dismissed all complaints—twenty-four of the 
motions to dismiss were granted based on the fact that section 16(b)’s 
two-year statute of limitations “had expired long before Simmonds 
filed the suits.” 151 Thus, the district court did not address the 
defendant underwriters’ claim that they were exempt under the 
underwriter exemption. 152 The plaintiff-respondent appealed the 
decision, and the Ninth Circuit decided the case in 2010.
149 Brief for Petitioners, Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414 (No. 10-1261) at *36 
(emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
150 Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1418 
(2012).
151 Id. 
152 Simmonds v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 638 F.3d 1072, 1086 (9th 
Cir. 2010).
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2. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Based on the precedent set in Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp.,153
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision in 
part.154 Particularly, the Ninth Circuit reversed “the district court’s 
conclusion that all of Simmonds’s claims are time-barred.” 155 In 
Whittaker, the Ninth Circuit held that section 16(b)’s statute of 
limitations period is “tolled until the insider discloses his transactions 
in a Section 16(a) filing, regardless of whether the plaintiff knew or 
should have known of the conduct at issue.” 156 The petitioner 
underwriters cited Lampf, 157 to argue that “[section] 16(b)’s 
limitations period is a period of repose, which is not to be ‘extended 
to account for a plaintiff’s discovery of the facts underlying a 
claim.’”158
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in 
2011 to review the issue of “whether the 2-year period to file suit 
against a corporate insider under § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 . . . begins to run only upon the insider’s filing of the 
disclosure statement required by § 16(a) of the Act.”159 At the time 
of the Supreme Court’s review, the persons who allegedly violated 
this rule had yet to file a section 16(a) statement.160
153 639 F.2d 516 (1981).
154 Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. at 1418.
155 Simmonds, 638 F.3d at 1099.
156 Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. at 1418 (citation omitted).
157 Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 
360 (1991).
158 Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. at 1419 (citation omitted).
159 Id. at 1417 (citations omitted).
160 Id. at 1420.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF OPINION
In the present case, the statute of limitations at issue concerns 
section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.161
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in Simmonds, 
consisting of one split decision and one unanimous holding. The 
Supreme Court was “split 4–4 on the question of whether equitable 
tolling even applies to the two-year period for bringing claims under 
§ 16(b)” and “effectively left that issue open for another day.”162 But 
the Court did come to a unanimous holding that “assuming the two-
year period can be extended, the tolling rules . . . [of] the Ninth 
Circuit and Second Circuit impermissibly deviated from ordinary 
equitable tolling principles.”163
A. The Supreme Court’s Rejection of the Ninth Circuit’s Whittaker
Rule to Section 16(b) Claims
The Supreme Court rejected Simmonds’s argument that the 
Whittaker rule applied, basing its rejection on two main rationales.164
First, under what seems to be a congressional intent analysis, the 
Court stated that the text of section 16 “simply does not support the 
Whittaker rule” because the statute expressly stated that the “2-year 
clock starts from ‘the date such profit was realized.’”165 The Court 
noted that “Congress could have very easily provided that ‘no such 
suit shall be brought more than two years after the filing of a 
statement under subsection (a)(2)(C).”166
161 See supra Part II.A for a detailed discussion of the rule; see also supra
Part II.C for a discussion of the split of authority for this issue before the Simmonds
decision.
162 Supreme Court Rejects Open-Ended Tolling Of Section 16(b) Claims In 
Simmonds, 9 NO. 5 SEC. LITIG. REP. 18 (2012) [hereinafter Supreme Court Rejects 
Open-Ended Tolling].
163 Id.
164 Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. at 1419–20.
165 Id. at 1419 (citation omitted).
166 Id. (emphasis in original).
 
                                                          
Fall 2013 Missing the Mark 845
Second, the Supreme Court noted that the purpose of the 
Whittaker rule is “inconsistent with the general purpose of statutes of 
limitations,” and that the rule does not coincide with established 
principles of equitable tolling.167 The Court lends a reminder that the 
purpose of a statute of limitations is “to protect defendants against 
stale or unduly delayed claims.”168 In addressing equitable tolling, 
the Court stated that “[t]he Whittaker court suggested that the 
background rule of equitable tolling for fraudulent concealment 
operates to toll the limitations period until the § 16(a) statement is 
filed.” 169 The Court opined that the Whittaker rationale would 
actually be “inequitable” tolling, which is especially apparent in the 
present case. 170 It explained that the Whittaker rule’s inequitable 
application was exemplified by the fact that the liability theory 
regarding underwriters was “so novel that . . . [underwriters] can 
plausibly claim that they were not aware they were required to file a 
§ 16(a) statement.  And where they disclaim the necessity of filing, 
the Whittaker rule compels them either to file or to face the prospect 
of § 16(b) litigation in perpetuity.” 171 The Court pointed out the 
anomaly that Simmonds’s argument would create, because she knew 
about the purchase and sale, and had sued, but the underwriters had 
not yet filed a section 16(a) disclosure; thus, she still had two years to 
sue continually until they file.172 Even Simmonds acknowledged the 
possibility of this inequity.173
The Supreme Court ultimately relied on a congressional intent 
analysis in reaching its decision to “reject [such] a departure from 
167 Id.
168 Id. at 1420 (citation omitted).
169 Id. at 1419 (footnote omitted). “Generally, a litigant seeking equitable 
tolling bears the burden of establishing . . . (1) that he has been pursuing his rights 
diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”  Id.
(emphasis in original) (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). See 
supra, Part II.C–D for a detailed discussion on equitable tolling. 
170 Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. at 1420.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
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settled equitable-tolling principles.”174 The Court determined, based 
on the express words of section 16(b), that the statute of limitations 
runs from when profit is realized, stating that “Congress did not 
intend that the limitations period be categorically tolled until the 
statement is filed: The limitation provision does not say so.”175 The 
Court further explained that “[t]he usual equitable-tolling inquiry” is 
sufficient because “the limitations period would not expire until two 
years after a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have learned the facts 
underlying a § 16(b) action.” 176 The Court supported its ruling 
regarding the sufficiency of the usual equitable tolling principles by 
explaining that when courts apply a doctrine or principle to an issue 
that Congress is silent about, they may “permit[] an inference that 
Congress intended to apply ordinary background . . . principles,” and 
not that Congress “intended to apply an unusual modification of 
those rules.”177
B. The Unsettled Issue of Whether the Equitable Tolling Principle 
Applies to Section 16(b)’s Time Limit
Although the Court held that section 16(b)’s “limitation . . . 
period is not tolled until” a section 16(a) statement is filed, it 
expressly stated that “[w]e are divided 4 to 4 concerning, and thus 
affirm without precedential effect, the Court of Appeals’ rejection of 
petitioners’ contention that § 16(b) establishes a period of repose that 
is not subject to tolling.”178
But in affirming the Ninth Circuit’s application of equitable 
tolling, although without precedential effect, the Court may have 
influenced the courts of appeals to apply equitable tolling rather than 
go the other way.  And because of the dearth of section 16(b) 
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 1421 (emphasis in original) (quoting Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 
280, 286 (2003)).
178 Id.
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litigation in recent years, it may take some time before the issue is 
brought before a circuit court, especially one that had applied the 
“repose” school of thought prior to the Simmonds decision.179
V. IMPACT
Because the Supreme Court essentially left the issue of the 
applicability of ordinary principles of equitable tolling open, it is 
necessary to peer into the decisions of several courts to find how each 
court may differently treat a section 16(b) claim—some courts of 
appeals may not apply equitable tolling at all, and some courts may 
apply general principles of equitable tolling.  Unfortunately, too few 
cases have been heard on this issue, both before and after Simmonds.
This section will summarize interpretations that have formed after 
Simmonds, and then refer to impacts resulting from the Supreme 
Court’s holding on another provision pertaining to insider trading.
A. Interpretations of the Simmonds Decision
“Lower courts now will have to decide how traditional 
principles of equitable tolling apply, and may consider anew whether 
equitable tolling should even apply to § 16(b).”180 Thus, this issue 
will likely go to the Supreme Court again—someday—and at that 
time, the Court may decide that equitable tolling need not apply at 
all. 181 In the Securities Litigations Report, however, the authors 
viewed the Supreme Court as “favoring strict statutory interpretation 
to define the scope of the federal securities laws.”182 It elaborated by 
explaining that the Court “narrowly construe[s] the private rights of 
action arising under the federal securities laws to curb the 
179 Most section 16(b) claims have been brought in the Ninth and Second 
Circuits, and both courts have traditionally applied equitable tolling principles to 
those causes of action.  This fact, coupled with the small number of section 16(b) 
cases, means the chances of this issue being brought up in a different circuit court 
in the short to mid term are likely low.
180 Supreme Court Rejects Open-Ended Tolling, supra note 162, at 19.
181 Id.
182 Id.
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development of novel and expansive theories of liability that 
Congress did not contemplate or expressly authorize.”183 After all, 
section 16(b) clearly states that a cause of action exists for two years 
after profits are made—which some may interpret as a period of 
repose.  In the future, much of the decision may depend on how 
easily detectable short-swing profits are in measuring the fairness of 
applying a short, two-year period of repose.
B. Subsequent Lower Court Decisions
After the reinforcement of other provisions regulating insider 
trading, “The number of reported § 16(b) cases has declined 
significantly in the last two decades.”184 Two likely factors for this
decrease are “improved distribution of information about the dangers 
of inadvertent violations” and “exemptive regulations promulgated 
by the SEC in 1991 and 1996” regarding section 16(b) liability.185
Thus, as a result of the recency of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Simmonds, and the lack of cases arising under section 16(b) in 
general, very few subsequent cases have come before the federal 
courts.  Thus far, the few subsequent cases involving section 16(b) 
litigation originate from New York, the financial capital of the world, 
and only one directly applies the Simmonds decision.  
In Chechele v. Morgan Stanley, the plaintiff, Chechele, sued 
Morgan Stanley and its subsidiaries, seeking disgorgement of short-
swing profits.186 The District Court for the Southern District of New 
York, relying on the Supreme Court decision in Simmonds, departed 
from the old Second Circuit precedent, which mandated that tolling 
end when the plaintiff “gets actual notice that a person subject to 
183 Id. at 20.
184 HAMILTON, MACEY & MOLL, supra note 22, at 929.
185 Id. “The last sentence of § 16(b) grants the SEC power to exempt 
transactions from that section if they are ‘not comprehended within the purpose of 
this subsection.’”  Id.
186 896 F. Supp. 2d 297, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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section 16(a) has realized specific short-swing profits.”187 With the 
old Second Circuit rule overturned, Chechele followed the Supreme 
Court’s Simmonds holding and applied the Second Circuit’s usual 
principle for equitable tolling: “we will apply the equitable tolling 
doctrine ‘as a matter of fairness’ where plaintiff has been ‘prevented 
in some extraordinary way from exercising his rights.’”188 The court
found that the plaintiff knew or should have known “the facts 
necessary to plead her section 16(b) claim more than two years” 
before filing the complaint.189 It held that she did not (1) “pursu[e] 
her rights diligently” or (2) show “that some extraordinary
circumstance stood in her way.”190 Because these were two essential 
elements to toll a statute of limitations for fraud, the court dismissed 
her action as “time-barred.”191
C. Other Influential Supreme Court Decisions on Statute of Repose 
for Insider Trading Provisions and Congressional Response
Having only answered one of the issues—regardless of 
whether equitable tolling applies, the clock does not run after a 
required disclosure—the Supreme Court has left the question of 
whether equitable tolling even applies to section 16(b) at all for 
another day.  To address the question of how the Court may decide if 
this issue were brought up again, it would be helpful to review other 
Supreme Court decisions regarding related provisions in securities 
law.  The most obvious provision to analyze would be section 10(b) 
and the accompanying Rule 10b-5’s anti-fraud provisions.  It would 
187 Id. at 302 (quoting Litzler v. CC Invs., L.D.C., 362 F.3d 203, 208 (2d 
Cir. 2004), abrogated by Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 
1414 (2012)).
188 Chechele, 896 F. Supp. 2d at 303 (quoting Miller v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. 
Corp., 755 F.2d 20, 24 (2d Cir. 1985)).  The court further emphasized that “we had 
in mind a situation where a plaintiff ‘could show that it would have been 
impossible for a reasonably prudent person to learn’ about his or her cause of 
action.”  Id. (emphasis in original). 
189 Chechele, 896 F. Supp. 2d at 304.
190 Id. (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814 (2005)).
191 Chechele, 896 F. Supp. 2d at 304.
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also be beneficial to review the legislature’s reaction to the Court’s 
Rule 10b-5 limitation period decision in order to better understand 
Congress’s administrative intent. 
This section will first discuss how section 10(b) relates to 
section 16(b) and then analyze the procedural and legislative history 
of the provision’s statutory time limit in order to catch a glimpse of 
how the Supreme Court and Congress may react to a future claim 
based on a section 16(b) issue.  Finally, this section will detail other 
comments and opinions to gain insight into the views of some of the 
Justices.   
1. The Supreme Court’s Decisions on Section 10(b)’s Period of 
Limitation
Aside from section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, most insider 
trading cases arise under Rule 10b-5 claims—section 10(b) and the 
SEC’s accompanying Rule 10b-5 “are the principal statutory 
weapons against fraud.  Section 10b is the antifraud provision of the 
Exchange Act, while Rule 10b-5 is the rule the SEC promulgated 
under that section.”192 Before statutory limitations periods existed, 
courts generally utilized four different alternatives in applying a 
statutory limitations period to fraud claims, 193 with one of the 
methods borrowing language from section 16(b):
(1) apply by analogy the statutes of limitations 
applicable to private remedies under Section 13 of 
the 1933 Act; (2) apply the forum state’s statute of 
limitations for common law fraud; (3) apply the 
192 Legal Info. Inst., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, CORNELL 
UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/securities_exchange_act_of_1934 (last visited 
Oct. 25, 2013).  “Rule 10b-5 prohibits the use of any ‘device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud,’ and creates liability for any misstatement or omission of a material fact, 
or one that investors would think was important to their decision to buy or sell the 
stock.”  Id.
193 HAZEN, supra note 39, § 12.16[1].
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statute of limitations for securities fraud under the 
forum state’s blue sky law; 194 or (4) apply the 
limitations period from section 9(e), section 16(b), 
or section 18(a). . . .195
Beginning in 1988, Rule 10b-5 authorized private rights of action 
through express congressional measures. 196 However, Congress 
remained silent as to the legislative intent regarding the statute of 
limitations.  
Finally, in 1991, the issue of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5’s 
statute of limitations came before the Supreme Court in Lampf.197 In 
the Lampf decision, the Court held that “[l]itigation instituted 
pursuant to § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 . . . must be commenced within 
one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and 
within three years after such violation.”198 In effect, the Supreme 
Court had created a one-year statute of limitations—running from the 
time of discovery of the violation—and a three-year statute of repose 
that would not be affected by any tolling doctrines.  The Court based 
its decision on the following rationale:
[A] court should look first to the statute of origin to 
ascertain the proper limitations period.  We can 
imagine no clearer indication of how Congress would 
have balanced the policy considerations implicit in 
194 See supra Part II.B for a description of state common law fraud time 
limitations and blue sky laws.
195 HAZEN, supra note 39, § 12.16[1]. The limitation for private remedies 
deemed the period to be “one year from discovery or reasonable discovery but no 
more than three years after the sale or, if applicable, from the public offering.”  Id.
Section 9(e), now called section 9(f), states the limitation as “one-year from 
discovery, three years after violation.”  Id. at n.3.  Section 18(a) prescribes the 
period to be “one year from discovery, thee years after the violation.”  See also 15 
U.S.C. § 77m (2012).
196 HAZEN, supra note 39, § 12.16; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l.
197 See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 
350 (1991); see also Part II.D.2.
198 Lampf, 501 U.S. at 364; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013), for 
details on Rule 10b-5.
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any limitations provisions than the balance struck by 
the same Congress in limiting similar and related 
protections.199
Following this rationale, the Court relied on other provisions 
of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.200 The Court commented on the standard 
of application that a lower court should use in the absence of a 
finding of a clear legislative intent:
Where a federal cause of action tends in practice to 
“encompass numerous and diverse topics and 
subtopics,” such that a single state limitations 
period may not be consistently applied within a 
jurisdiction, we have concluded that the federal 
interests in predictability and judicial economy 
counsel the adoption of one source, or class of 
sources, for borrowing purposes.201
This statement alludes to a favor of uniformity in application of a 
statute of limitations and repose to further legitimate federal interests 
and policy considerations. 
199 Lampf, 501 U.S. at 359. 
200 DAVID A. LIPTON, 15A BROKER-DEALER REG. § 5:30 (2011-2012).  
The existing statutes that the Court relied on were as follows: 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e), 
15 U.S.C. § 78r(c), and 15 U.S.C. § 77m.  Id.  Also, regarding distinctions in 
terminology for the different one- and three-year periods within the 1933 and 1934 
Acts, the Court noted, “To the extent that these distinctions in the future might 
prove significant, we select as the governing standard for an action under § 10(b) 
the language of . . . 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e).”  Lampf, 501 U.S. at 364 n.9.  The majority 
opinion, written by Justice Blackmun, briefly addressed section 16(b); it had been 
considered for reliance but ultimately dismissed from consideration because its 
focus—disgorgement of unlawful profits—differed from section 10(b).  Id. at 360 
n.5.  Another possible reason, although not stated in the opinion, could be because 
section 16(b) did not contain the two-tiered limitation structure that section 10(b) 
and the others contained.
201 Lampf, 501 U.S. at 357.
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2. Congressional Response to Lampf: Affirmed in Part
Congress expressed its agreement with the Lampf decision on 
two occasions following 1991.  First, within one year of the Supreme 
Court’s decision, Congress added section 27A to the 1934 Act, which 
provided that for private civil actions under section 10(b), “the 
limitations period is that provided by the laws applicable in the 
jurisdiction as they existed on June 19, 1991.” 202 Although this 
addition denied retroactive application of the Lampf decision, it also 
acknowledged the statute of limitation and repose set by the Court’s 
holding for future actions.  The second instance occurred in 
concurrence with efforts to recover from the accounting scandals of 
2002.203 Congress passed a new Act, which provided more concrete 
recognition of the issues discussed in Lampf and the need to 
expressly state a statute of limitations and repose:
202 LIPTON, supra note 200; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1.
203 “Numerous events involving fraud and misconduct . . . shocked and 
angered both the business community and ordinary investors.  Investors began to 
bail out of securities holdings, and a sharp decline in securities prices followed.”  
HAMILTON, MACEY & MOLL, supra note 22, at 547.  Although several corporate 
wrongdoings define this era, “Undoubtedly, the most violent initial shock . . . was 
the unexpected collapse of Enron Corporation in November, 2001.”  Id. at 541.  
Just one year earlier, Enron had been hailed by Fortune magazine as one of the 
most admired companies.  Id. at 542; see also Nicholas Stein, The World’s Most 
Admired Companies, FORTUNE, Oct. 2, 2000, at 182.  Enron and thirteen affiliates 
had filed for bankruptcy as a result of overstating earnings and creating “special 
purpose entities” to hide “very substantial liabilities and avoid disclosure.”  
HAMILTON, MACEY & MOLL, supra note 22, at 542.  The once prominent 
accounting firm Arthur Andersen also collapsed with the scandal, as it had been the 
auditor for Enron—the firm “had engaged in a ‘cleaning’ of Enron files related to 
its financial activities shortly before Enron collapsed, and as a result was convicted 
of obstruction of justice.”  Id. at 543.  Another notable collapse was that of 
WorldCom, a telecommunications corporation.  The company announced in 2002 
that it had overstated profits by categorizing certain expenses as capital investments 
instead.  Id. at 543–44.  Senior executives “were arrested and charged with 
securities fraud, conspiracy to commit securities fraud and making false statements 
to the SEC.”  Id. at 544.  For a more detailed account of the series of events leading 
up to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, see id. at 540–49.
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In July 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
[(SOX)] . . . was signed into law.  This Act, 
approved by nearly unanimous votes in both houses 
of Congress . . . . amended a general statute of 
limitation which applies to civil actions arising 
under Acts of Congress. . . . The [SOX] amendment 
provided that, notwithstanding the general 
limitations period, a separate statute of limitations 
will apply to a private action, involving “a claim of 
fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance in 
contravention of a regulatory requirement 
concerning the ‘securities laws.’’204
Congress altered the Supreme Court’s decision in Lampf to 
declare that the statute of limitations is two years and the statute of 
repose is five years.205
Courts have limited SOX application to Rule 10b-5, based on 
a distinction found in the texts of the Act’s provisions that read: “The 
violations to which SOX’s limitations apply sound in fraud.  Many of 
the ‘anti-fraud’ provisions of the securities acts, however, on their 
face, apply to misstatements which might or might not involve 
fraud.”206 Most recently, in Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, the Supreme 
Court, for the first time, interpreted the two-year statute of limitations 
set by SOX. 207 The Court held that “a cause of action accrues (1) 
204 LIPTON, supra note 200 (footnotes omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 
1658(b).
205 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b).  In Lampf, the Solicitor General had “appear[ed] 
on behalf of the [SEC] . . . urg[ing] the application of [a] 5-year statute of repose.”  
Lampf, 501 U.S. at 355.  The Court had rejected this for other limitations written in 
the original Acts.  However, Justice Kennedy’s dissent pointed towards no period 
of repose for fraud-based claims or, as the Solicitor General urged and as Congress 
later implemented, a reasonable five-year period.  See id. at 374–79 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting); see also infra Part VI for a further explanation of his dissent.
206 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b).
207 130 S. Ct. 1784 (2010). The case involved a claim brought by a group 
of investors against Merck for “knowingly misrepresent[ing] the risks of heart 
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when the plaintiff did in fact discover, or (2) when a reasonably 
diligent plaintiff would have discovered, ‘the facts constituting the 
violation’—whichever comes first.”208 The Court deemed, and all 
parties agreed, that “discovery” referred “not only to a plaintiff’s 
actual discovery of certain facts, but also to the facts that a 
reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered.”209 It further 
noted that  “[f]raud is deemed to be discovered . . . when, in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, it could have been discovered.”210
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the decision in Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC 
v. Simmonds does give guidelines on the limits of equitable tolling 
for section 16(b) claims, the Supreme Court’s split decision still 
leaves this issue unresolved. 
Justice Blackmun, who wrote for the majority in Lampf,
expressly stated, “Section 16(b) . . . sets a 2-year rather than a 3-year 
period of repose.”211 Justice Scalia, in his concurrence, did not raise 
issue with this statement.212 Justice Kennedy wrote a separate dissent 
in which he generally disagreed with the application of any short 
period of repose for fraud-based actions, and indicated that only in 
rare circumstances could a five-year repose period be imposed.213 He 
had, however, also opined that “[a] reasonable statute of repose . . . is 
not without its merits.  It may sometimes be easier to determine when 
attacks accompanying the use of Merck’s pain-killing drug” and brought an action 
for securities fraud under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.  Id. at 1790.
208 Id. at 1789–90. 
209 Id. at 1793 (emphasis in original). The Court commented that the word 
“discover” in statute of limitations determinations was often connected to the 
“discovery rule” doctrine, which “delays accrual of a cause of action until the 
plaintiff has ‘discovered’ it.”  Id.
210 Id. at 1794.
211 Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 
360 n.5 (1991) (emphasis added).
212 See id. at 364–69 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
213 Id. at 377–78 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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a fraud occurred than when it should have been discovered.”214 He 
thus indicated that in some types of claims, he would not be as closed 
to the possibility of a statute of repose, so long as it would not upset 
principles of fairness.  In his Lampf dissent, Justice Kennedy stated a 
key point—the limitation statutes that the Majority relied on 
“appl[ied] to strict liability violations.”215 Section 16(b) is also a 
form of strict liability.  Will the Court turn to its Lampf methodology 
or depart from it?  Will it consider the congressional trend toward 
administering both a statute of limitations and a statute of repose?
As for the legislature, through its decisions in adopting SOX 
and the other regulations preceding it, Congress is moving towards 
administering a dual time limitation structure of (1) a shorter statute 
of limitations from time of discovery and (2) a longer statute of 
repose.  And as discussed earlier, Congress has applied shorter statute 
of repose periods for strict liability type provisions.
The Supreme Court may have fortunately, or conveniently, 
avoided a final decision involving the sensitive task of interpreting 
legislative intent, this time, with Simmonds. And it may very well 
have dodged the task of resolving this issue for a substantial time to 
come, thanks to difficulties explained earlier in this case note—
namely, a dearth of section 16(b) litigation.  But unless legislation 
does away with section 16 of the 1934 Act, the Supreme Court will 
have to address the split of opinion among the courts—and an 
important factor in its analysis will likely be how readily 
discoverable section 16 violations are, and the importance of striking 
a balance of fairness between the claimants and the alleged violators.
214 Id. at 378.
215 Id. at 376.
 
                                                          
